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Article
KEEPING OUT THE LITTLE GUY: AN OLDER CONTRACT
ADVISOR'S CONCERN, A YOUNGER CONTRACT
ADVISOR'S LAMENT
LLOYD ZANE REMICK*
CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH CABOTT**

I.

INTRODUCTION

ImagineJane, a twenty-six year-old attorney who just passed the Pennsylvania Bar exam and the National Football League Players' Association
("NFLPA ") contract advisor's certification exam. Having passed these ex1
ams, Jane now seeks to pursue her dream of becoming a contract advisor.
Luckily, Jane's monthly expenses are low. Her combined rent, student
loans, car payments and office overhead, including bills and utilities, only
* Lloyd Z. Remick, Esq. received his B.S. from Wharton School in 1959, his
J.D. from Temple University School of Law in 1962, and his LL.M. in Tax Law
from Villanova School of Law in 1984. He is a nationally recognized entertainment and sports attorney and certified NFLPA contract advisor. In addition, he
represents a number of award winning recording artists and producers, including
the late Grammy Award winning Grover Washington, Jr. Mr. Remick is also President of Zane Management, Incorporated, a Philadelphia based sports, entertainment, and communications consulting and management firm
(www.zanemanagement.com). He is an adjunct professor at Temple University
School of Law, where he teaches entertainment and sports law, and Temple University's School of Tourism and Hospitality Management, where he teaches hospitality law. Throughout his career Professor Remick has written a number of
entertainment and sports related articles and textbooks. Professor Remick's email
address is lzr@braverlaw.com.

** Christopher Joseph Cabott received his B.A. from La Salle University in
2001 and is currently a third year law student at Widener University School of Law
in Wilmington, Delaware. Mr. Cabott is President of the Student Bar Association
and a member of the Moot Court Honor Society. He is a law clerk for Lloyd Z.
Remick, Esq., and seeks to practice entertainment and sports law upon passing the
Pennsylvania bar. Special thanks to Ariana Holder who aided in the preparation
of this article.
1. Although one does not have to be a lawyer to be an agent or a contract
advisor, a substantial portion of agents and contract advisors are sports lawyers as
there is great demand for legal advice in the relationship amongst agents, athletes,
college teams and professional franchises.
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total $2,500 a month. The only expenses remainingbefore she startspracticing are state registrationfees and practice costs. Being the well-organized
person she is, Janejots down the following expenses and notes, all of which
are independent of her aforementioned personal expenses and practice
overhead.
1.
2.
3.
4.

$1,600 - NFLPA certificationfee.
$200 - Roundtrip ticket to the NFLPA annual seminar.
$200 - Lodging/Cabfare for the seminar.
State registrationfees (Note to self - only register in states within
driving distance. If I provide great individualservice, the practice
will grow):
a. Pennsylvania - $200 plus $100 underwriter'sfee for the
bond.
b. Maryland - $1,000
c. New York - $100
d. Connecticut - $200
e. Ohio - $500
f
New Jersey - $0 (No athlete agent laws there yet, so no fee!)
g. Delaware - $2,500
h. West Virginia - $50
5. Annual transportation(gas, tolls, etc.) - $1,000
6. MalpracticeInsurance - $3,000
TOTAL - $10,650for year one, before personalexpenses orprac2
tice overhead.
After compiling this list, Janepays thesefees and sets forth in pursuit of
her dream. Six months later,Jane has yet to secure a client. She did have
one player, but he was only on the practice squad and his team cut him
during the pre-season. Consequently, she is behind on her carpayments and
cannot afford the upcoming NFLPA annual renewal fee of $1,200. If
things continue this way, she will not be able to renew her registrationin the
foregoing states, even if she excludes Delaware and/or Maryland.
A month later,Jane's struggles continue. Fortunately, she was able to
move back in with her parents, but her debt and bills are mounting. With
no hope in sight,Janeis forced to abandon her ailingpractice. As she walks
out of her office for the last time, she glances back with tears in her eyes and
promises herself that one day she will be a successful contract advisor.
It is not fair that Jane could not afford to compete in the field
of her choice. Unfortunately, it is a reality that aspiring NFLPA
2. This list is for illustration purposes only. It does not include the registration fees associated with representing clients in Major League Baseball, professional hockey or professional basketball.
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contract advisors face at the hands of the Uniform Athlete Agents
Act ("UAAA"), the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act
("SPARTA"), Section 2(g) of the NFLPA's Rules Governing Contract Advisors ("Section 2(g)"), and the myriad of state registration
fees.

3

These regulations and the fees they produce are unfair, because they bar young contract advisors from the industry. 4 Simultaneously, that unfairness reduces professional business intimacy.
The solution to these problems is creating an affordable federal licensure for athlete agents. To establish licensure, we must modify
the UAAA, amend SPARTA and revise Section 2(g).
This article reviews the background of the athlete agent industry, depicts the problems associated with the aforementioned regulations and fees, and details the foregoing solution.
II.

BACKGROUND

In the last thirty-five years, the athlete agent industry has
changed dramatically. Early on there were a handful of sports lawyers and agents. Today, professional sports and its promotion dominate American popular culture. Consequently, agents have the
potential to earn handsome livings. As a result, law schools and
undergraduate institutions are filled with young men and women,
seeking to become the next super sports agent to the stars and receive the fame of HBO's Arliss or the fabled "Show Me the Money"
Jerry McGuire.
During this boom, a handful of agents put their pecuniary interest ahead of their clients' better interest. Armed with cash, cars,
plane tickets and jewelry, these agents duped a number of naive
student-athletes into signing agency contracts prior to the expiration of their collegiate eligibility. In turn, several of these studentathletes became ineligible. 5 Simultaneously, the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") sanctioned their academic
3. For a complete breakdown of the registration and renewal fees associated
with each UAAA and non-UAAA state and territory, see Appendix B.
4. Despite this article's focus on the contract advisor industry and the NFLPA,
the inherent problems caused by the UAAA, SPARTA and state registration fees
apply equally, if not greater, to those who represent professional basketball, baseball and hockey players. This article's focus on football illustrates a point that is
widely applicable in sports and entertainment law.
5. See William E. Kirwan, Protecting College Athletes from Unscrupulous Agents, at
http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/enforcement/agents/sajinfo/agentPacket.
html#chronicalArticle (Sept. 26, 1996) (indicating how some student athletes lost
their eligibility to unscrupulous agents). The NCAA bylaws that are most relevant
to ineligibility are the following:
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institutions for playing them in intercollegiate competition despite
12.1.1 Amateur status. An individual loses amateur status and thus
shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition in a particular sport if
the individual: ...
(d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of
expenses or any other form of financial assistance from a professional
sports organization based upon athletic skill or participation, except as
permitted by NCAA rules and regulations.
12.2.4.3. .. An individual who retains an agent shall lose amateur
status.
12.3.1 GeneralRule. An individual shall be ineligible for participation
in an intercollegiate sport if he or she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the purpose of marketing his or
her athletic ability or reputation in that sport. Further, an agency contract not specifically limited in writing to a sport or particular sports shall
be deemed applicable to all sports, and the individual shall be ineligible
to participate in any sport.
12.3.1.1 Representationfor Future Negotiations. An individual shall be
ineligible per Bylaw 12.3.1 if he or she enters into a verbal or written
agreement with an agent for representation in future professional sport
negotiations that are to take place after the individual has completed his
or her eligibility in that sport.
12.3.1.2 Benefits from ProspectiveAgents. An individual shall be ineligible per Bylaw 12.3.1 if he or she (or his or her relatives or friends) accepts
transportation or other benefits from: ...
(b) An agent, even if the agent has indicated that he or she has
no interest in representing the student-athlete in the marketing of his or
her athletic ability or reputation and does not represent individuals in

the student-athlete's sport.
31.2.2.4 ParticipationWhile Ineligible. When a student-athlete competing as an individual or representing the institution in a team championship is declared ineligible subsequent to the competition, or a penalty has
been imposed or action as set forth in Bylaw 19.5.2.2-(e) or 19.7 of the
NCAA enforcement program, the Committee on Infractions may require
the following:
(a) Individual Competition. The individual's performance may be
stricken from the championship records, the points the student has contributed to the team's total may be deleted, the team standings may be
adjusted accordingly, and any awards involved may be returned to the
Association. For those championships in which individual results are recorded by time, points or stroke totals (i.e., cross country, golf, gymnastics, indoor track and field, outdoor track and field, rifle, swimming and
skiing), the placement of other competitors may be altered and awards
presented accordingly. For those championships in which individual results are recorded by advancement through a bracket or head-to-head
competition, the placement of other competitors shall not be altered.
(b) Team Competition. The record of the team's performance
may be deleted, the team's place in the final standings may be vacated,
and the team's trophy and the ineligible student's award may be returned
to the Association.
2003-04 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL: CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYLAWS,
ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS, August 1, 2003 [hereinafter 2003-04 NCAA Manual],
available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division-i-manual/200304/2003-04 dl-manual.pdf.
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their ineligibility. 6 In a few cases, unethical agents defrauded their
clients out of millions. 7 In order to prevent further ineligibility and
sanctions, a number of states enacted athlete agent regulations. 8
Unfortunately, a majority of these laws lacked registration requirements and enforcement penalties. 9 Thus, dubious agents often
went unidentified and unpunished.
In response to the need for efficient agent regulation, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") drafted the UAAA. 1° Soon thereafter, Congressmen Tom
Osborne and Bart Gordon authored SPARTA. Additionally, the
NFLPA enacted the Rules Governing Contract Advisors ("RGCA").
The background of each regulation is discussed below.
A.

UAAA

In 1997, the NCAA and several major universities asked the
NCCUSL to draft a model uniform agent regulation.1 In response,
the NCCUSL drafted the UAAA in Fall 2000. The purpose of the
UAAA is to regulate agents, protect academic institutions from
6. See Kirwan, supra note 7 (discussing NCAA sanctions on academic institutions for playing ineligible student athletes in intercollegiate competition). The
NCAA bylaw that is most relevant to sanctions is 31.2.2.5 InstitutionalPenalty for
Ineligible Participation,which states: "When an ineligible student-athlete participates
in an NCAA championship and the student-athlete or the institution knew or had
reason to know of the ineligibility, the NCAA Committee on Infractions may assess
a financial penalty." 2003-04 NCAA Manual, supra note 7.
7. See Marc Jenkins, Note, The United Student-Athletes of America: Should College
Athletes Organize in Order to Protect Their Rights and Address the Ills of Intercollegiate
Athletics?, 5 VAND.J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 39, 42 (2003) (discussing Tank Black-University of Florida scandal).
8. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT, Prefatory Note, 7 U.L.A. 191 (Supp. 2000)
(noting approximately twenty-eight states enacted statutes regulating athlete
agents).
9. See id. (indicating regulatory laws do not have uniform registration requirements and penalties). "There are substantial differences in the registration procedures, disclosures required and requirements relating to record maintenance,
reporting, renewal, notice, warning and security." Id.
10. See Uniform Athlete Agent Act (UAAA) History and Status, at http://
wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/enforcement/agents/uaaa/history.html (last visited
Nov. 21, 2004) [hereinafter UAAA History] (noting what NCCUSL is and its purpose). "NCCUSL is a national organization that drafts uniform and model state
laws and comprises more than 300 lawyers, judges, state legislators and law professors appointed by their respective states." Id.
11. See id. (noting number of states and territories adopting UAAA as their
primary form of agent regulation). The NCAA and several universities were
prompted by the lack of uniformity and lack of reciprocity. See UNIF. ATHLETE
AGENTS AcT, Prefatory Note, 7 U.L.A. 191 (Supp. 2000) (describing genesis of
UAAA).
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sanctions and reduce student-athlete ineligibility.12 As of Fall 2004,
twenty-eight states and two territories have adopted the UAAA as
13
their primary form of agent regulation.
To regulate agents, the UAAA imposes numerous requirements. First, agents must register with the state prior to contacting
a student-athlete.1 4 Second, they must disclose their professional
and criminal history.1 5 Third, agents must grant the Secretary of
State the authority to issue subpoenas if compliance information is
needed.1 6 Finally, the UAAA prohibits agents from funneling
money or tangible benefits to student-athletes.1 7 Those who violate
these regulations are subject to criminal and administrative
18
penalties.
The UAAA protects academic institutions by allowing them to
seek civil remedies from both agents and student-athletes if they are
sanctioned due to an agent, or a student-athlete's failure to notify
their athletic director regarding a signed agency contract within the
appropriate period of time.19
To reduce ineligibility, agents must provide student-athletes
with an ineligibility warning at the bottom of every agency contract. 20 Once an agency contract is signed, the agent and the student-athlete must forward written notice of the contractual
12. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS AcT, Prefatory Note, 7 U.L.A. 191 (Supp. 2000)
(discussing UAAA purpose).
13. See UAAA History, supra note 12 (noting number of states and territories
adopting UAAA as their primary form of agent regulation). For a further list of
states adopting the UAAA, see Appendix A.
14. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS AcT § 4(a), 7 U.L.A. 200 (Supp. 2000) (stating
agents must register with state prior to contacting student-athlete). On the other
hand, under § 4(b)(1) and (2), if the student-athlete initiates the contact, the
agent may still discuss representation with the athlete, providing that he or she
registers in the state of the student-athlete's academic residence within seven days.
See § 4(b) (1)-(2), 7 U.L.A. 200.
15. See §§ 5(a)(3), (8), 7 U.L.A. 201-02 (explaining agents must fully disclose
professional and criminal history).
16. See § 3(b), 7 U.L.A. 198 (showing agents must grant secretary of state authority to issue subpoenas).
17. See § 14(a)(2)-(3), 7 U.L.A. 219 (noting agents must not induce studentathlete into contract).
18. See §§ 15, 17, 7 U.L.A. 221, 224 (describing agents who violate UAAA regulations are subject to penalties).
19. See § 16, 7 U.L.A. 223 (stating civil remedies available to academic institutions against student athletes and agents).
20. See § 10(c), 7 U.L.A. 213-14 (stating agency contract must contain conspicuous notice in boldface type in capital letters). The agency contract must state:
WARNING TO STUDENT-ATHLETE
IF YOU SIGN THIS CONTRACT:
(1) YOU MAY LOSE YOUR ELIGIBILITY TO COMPETE AS A STUDENT-ATHLETE IN YOUR SPORT,
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relationship to the athletic director at the student-athlete's academic institution, or to any institution the agent reasonably
believes
the student-athlete will attend. 2 1 Such notice must be given
within
the lesser of 72 hours or the student-athlete's next scheduled
ath-

letic event. 22 Simultaneously, the UAAA gives student-athletes
the

right to cancel agency contracts within fourteen
days of
23
execution.
Ironically, the UAAA does not provide student-athletes with
a

right to seek civil remedies from agents if they are rendered
ineligi-

ble due to an agent's failure to abide by UAAA regulations.
Additionally, its safeguards do not apply to student-athletes who
have
exhausted their eligibility. 2 4 Lastly, registration fees vary
amongst
member states because the UAAA fails to establish a uniform
registration fee.
B. SPARTA
The House of Representatives passed SPARTA on June
4,

2003.25 Soon thereafter, Senator Ron Wyden (D-Or.)
filed an iden26

tical bill in the Senate.

On September 24, 2004, President George

(2) IF YOU HAVE ANATHLETIC DIRECTOR, WITHIN
72 HOURS OF
ENTERING INTO THIS CONTRACT, BOTH YOU
AND YOUR
ATHLETE AGENT MUST NOTIFY YOUR ATHLETIC
DIRECTOR;
AND
(3) YOU MAY CANCEL THIS CONTRACT WITHIN
14 DAYS AFTER
SIGNING IT. CANCELLATION OF THIS CONTRACT
MAY NOT
REINSTATE YOUR ELIGIBILITY
Id. (emphasis in original).
21. See § 11(a)-(b), 7 U.L.A. 216 (noting written notice
must be forwarded to
academic institution).
22. See id. (indicating notice requirement time limit).
23. See § 12(a), 7 U.L.A. 217 (indicating right to cancel).
24. See R. Michael Rogers, The Uniform Athlete Agent
Act Fails to Fully Protect the
College Athlete Who Exhausts His Eligibility Before Turning
Professiona 2 VA. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 63, 69-73 (2002) (explaining how
UAAA affects "Exhausted Eligibility
Athlete[s]"). The exhausted eligibility student-athlete
is one who has used all four
years of eligibility in his or her sport, but still remains
on campus as a student. See
id. at 69 (stating UAAA provides that if "an individual
is permanently ineligible to
participate in a particular intercollegiate sport, the individual
is not a student-athlete for purposes of that sport") (emphasis in original).
For example, Brian Westbrook, now a running back with the Philadelphia
Eagles, was an exhausted
eligibility student-athlete during the spring semester
following his last season of
college football at Villanova. See id. at 70.
25. See Gary Roberts, An Overview of the Recent Legal
Developments in Sports,
SPORTS LAwYERs Assoc. CONFERENCE 5 (Sports Lawyers
Assoc. Tul. Law), May 2022, 2004 (indicating how SPARTA came about in Federal
legislature).
26. See id. (referring to bill in Senate that resembles
Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act).
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W. Bush signed SPARTA into law. 27 SPARTA serves as a "federal
backstop" to the UAAA, as it focuses on regulation and
28
enforcement.
In terms of regulation, SPARTA makes it unlawful for an agent
to provide student-athletes with false or misleading information,
promises or representations, or anything of value. 29 Additionally,
agents must warn student-athletes in a disclosure form that they
may lose their eligibility if they sign an agency contract or falsify its
date. 30 Before entering into the agency contract, student-athletes
must sign the disclosure form. 31 Once the agency contract is
signed, both the agent and the athlete must contact the institution's athletic department within the lesser of 72 hours or the stu32
dent-athlete's next scheduled athletic event.
Seeking strict enforcement, SPARTA has the Federal Trade
33
Commission ("FTC") enforce its agency contract regulations.
27. Sports Agent Responsibility & Trust Act, Pub. L. No. 108-304, 118 Stat.
1125 (2004) (enacted 108 H.R. 361).
28. Federal Legislation Restricting Sports Agents Moves Forvard, LEGAL ISSUES IN
COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, Aug. 2002, at 1 (quoting U.S. Representative Tom Osborne who was University of Nebraska football coach before serving in Congress).
SPARTA is an "attempt to prevent agents from bribing student-athletes with expensive gifts and cash in exchange for the student's signing of a representation contract." Id. (indicating central goal of legislation).
29. See H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 2, at 2 (2003) (discussing § 3(a)(1)(A)-(B)
and agent regulation regarding misleading information). Prohibitions include
"any consideration in the form of a loan, or acting in the capacity of a guarantor or
co-guarantor for any debt ....
" Id. (discussing extent of statute).
30. See id. at 2-3 (discussing § 3(b)(3) and disclosure forms). The warning
must be conspicuous and in boldface type state the following:
Warning to Student Athlete: If you agree orally or in writing to be represented by an agent now or in the future you may lose your eligibility to
compete as a student athlete in your sport. Within 72 hours after entering into this contract or before the next athletic event in which you are
eligible to participate, whichever occurs first, both you and the agent by
whom you are agreeing to be represented must notify the athletic director of the educational institution at which you are enrolled, or other individual responsible for athletic programs at such educational institution,
that you have entered into an agency contract.
Id.
31. See id. at 2 (describing § 3(b) (2) and relevant disclosure forms). If the
student-athlete is under the age of 18, the parent or guardian must sign the contract. Id. (indicating consent required by SPARTA).
32. See id. at 4 (explaining § 6(a) and its instructions on contacting student
institutions).
33. See id. at 3 (setting forth § 4(a) and pertinent FTC regulation). "The
Commission shall enforce this Act in the same manner, by the same means, and
with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms and
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq.) were incorporated into and made a part of this Act." Id. (providing instructions for the appropriate government agency under § 4(b)).
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Specifically, SPARTA gives the FTC the authority to "enforce
[SPARTA] in the same manner, by the same means, and with the
same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms
and provisions of the [FTC] Act were incorporated into and made a
part of this Act." 34 Accordingly, the FTC fines agents $11,000 per
incident for unfair or deceptive acts or practices that violate
SPARTA. 35 The revenue generated from such fines is forwarded to
36
the U.S. Treasury.
SPARTA also permits state attorney generals to act in federal
court on behalf of the FTC.3 7 In these cases, all damages, restitution and other compensation go to the state. 38 A state also has a
cause of action on behalf of its residents if it has reason to believe
that an agent has threatened or adversely affected a resident's
39
interest.
Academic institutions may also seek remedial damages from
student-athletes or agents if their behavior causes it to incur expenses. 40 These expenses include losses resulting from penalties,
disqualification, suspension and/or restitution for losses suffered
due to self-imposed compliance actions. 4 ' Remedies for such suits
42
include enjoinder, enforcement, damages and restitution.
SPARTA does not, however, address registration fees or provide student-athletes with a cause of action if they are injured due to an
43
agent's misconduct.
34. H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 2, at 3 (noting § 4(b) and FTC authority concerning enforcement of SPARTA).
35. See Crissy Kaesebier, Federalbill designed to provide second line of agent defense,
NCAA NEws, at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2002/20020527/active/3911n37.html
(May 27, 2002) (discussing FTC fines and SPARTA).
36. See id. (indicating where money netted from fines gets placed).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 2, at 3 (2003) (discussing § 5(a)(1) and state
attorney general abilities to enforce FTC fines).
38. See id. (referring to § 5(a) (1) (C) and state damages).
39. See id. (describing § 5(a) (1) and state causes of action). "In any case in
which the attorney general of a State has reason to believe that an interest of the
residents of that State has been or is threatened or adversely affected by the engagement of any athlete agent in a practice that violates section 3 of this Act...
Id.
40. See id. at 4 (describing § 6(b) (1) and remedial damages). "An educational institution has a right of action against an athlete agent for damages caused
by a violation of this Act." Id.
41. See id. (discussing § 6(b)(2) and damages).
42. See H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 2, at 3 (2003) (discussing § 5(a)(1)(A)-(C)
and remedies for academic institutions).
43. See Scott Boras, Agent reform plan just a first step, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS
Bus. J., Jan. 26 - Feb. 1, 2004, at 25 (noting downfalls of SPARTA). Recently,
athlete agent Scott Boras was called before Congress to testify in regard to
SPARTA. See id. Boras stated that while he supports the bill, he is calling for an
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RGCA

In 1994, the Officers and Player Representatives of the NFLPA
adopted the RGCA for persons who desired to assist or represent
players in their contract negotiations with NFL Clubs. 44 The
NFLPA refers to these persons as contract advisors. The RGCA
were adopted and amended pursuant to the authority and duty
conferred upon the NFLPA as the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of NFL players, under Section 9(a) of the National
45
Labor Relations Act.

To be eligible for contract advisor certification, the following
requirements must be met. One must file a verified application for
certification, execute an information release with the NFLPA, and
pay the required application fee. 46 Currently, that fee is

$1,600.

47

In addition, one must have received a degree from an accredited
four-year college or university. 48 The NFLPA will grant an exception, however, if the applicant has sufficient negotiating experience. 49 Furthermore, new applicants must attend the annual
NFLPA seminar for new contract advisors and pass a written certification exam.5 0
Certification is only granted to individuals and not firms, corporations, partnerships, or other business entities. 5 1 There is no
limit, however, on the number of individuals in any one firm, corporation, partnership or other business entity who may be eligible
expansion to provide relief directly to the student-athlete in addition to the university. See id.
44. See generally NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N (NFLPA) REGS. GOVERNING CONTRACT ADvisoRs (amended Nov. 2003) [hereinafter NFLPA Regulations]
(describing origin of RGCA), available at http://www.nflpa.org/Agents/
main.asp?subPage=Agent+Regulations.
45. See id. (describing RGCA origin). Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") states:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rate of

pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2004).
46. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 2 (describing process to become
eligible for contract advisor certification).
47. See NELPA Application for Certification Checklist, at http://www.nflpa.org/
PDFs/Agents/AgentApplicationOnline.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (noting application fee).
48. See NELPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 2(A) (describing another requirement for new contract advisors).
49. See id. (stating exception to college degree requirement).
50. See id. (noting another requirement for new contract advisors).

51. See id. (stating who is eligible for certification).
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for certification. 52 Once certified, one must pay an annual fee,
53
which is currently $1,200.
The RGCA seek to ensure that players make informed decisions when they select a contract advisor; therefore, they establish
54
Contract advisors
contract advisor standards and regulations.
must adhere to the following standards. First, they must disclose
their qualifications on their certification applications, permit
outside audits, and act at all times in a fiduciary capacity on behalf
of players. 55 Second, they may only conduct individual negotiations
on behalf of a player if they sign a Standard Representation Agreement with the player, file a fully executed copy of that agreement
56
with the NFLPA and receive certification from the NFLPA. These
standards also govern providing players with advice, counsel, information and/or assistance with respect to their Club contracts, as
well as their conduct during compensation negotiations and any
other activity that bears directly upon the contract advisor's integ57
Such activities
rity, competence or ability to negotiate contracts.
include wealth management, tax counseling and preparation, fi58
nancial advice and investment services.
Turning to regulations, the RGCA regulate agency contracts
heavily. Accordingly, any agreement which does not meet NFLPA
standards is unenforceable and the contract advisor does not have a
right to receive compensation from it. 5 9 Further, the Standard
Player Agreement caps contract advisors' commission at three per0
cent of the player's performance compensation. 6 Simultaneously,
a contract advisor may not receive his or her commission until after
52. See id. (noting loophole in certification process).
53. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 2(H) (2) (noting annual fee requirement); see also NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N ANNUAL RENEWAL APPLICATION (2004) (stating annual fee) (on file with author).
54. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 3 (explaining purpose of
RGCA).
55. See id. at § 3(A)(1)-(17) (describing standards contract advisors must
meet).

56. See id. at § I(A) (explaining standards contract advisors must follow).
57. See id. (noting RGCA standards apply to many contract advisor activities
concerning their clients).
58. See id. (explaining various contract advisor activities that are governed by
RGCA standards).

59. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 4(A) (explaining effect when
NFLPA standards are not met).
60. See id. at § 4(B) (noting performance compensation includes salaries,
signing bonuses, reporting bonuses, roster bonuses, and any performance bonuses
earned during term of contract). An example of compensation not included
under this provision would be honor bonuses, such as "All Pro", "Pro Bowl", or

"Rookie of the Year." Id.
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the player receives compensation. 61 If the player decides otherwise,
however, the contract advisor may receive the commission up
front.

62

The RGCA prohibits a variety of contract advisor activities.
Contract advisors are prohibited from soliciting players through
money or merchandise, negotiating player contracts that violate
NFLPA policy, concealing material facts from players, filing a lawsuit against a player as opposed to using arbitration, and sharing
commissions with other contract advisors. 63 Additionally, contract
advisors may not initiate discussions with players about their current contract advisor agreement or NFL Club contract. 64 If the
player initiates the contact, however, the contract advisor may communicate with the player regarding the agreements. 65
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedures, requirements, fees
and prohibitions under Section 2(g), a contract advisor's certification automatically expires at the end of any three-year period, in
which he or she fails to negotiate and sign a player to a NFL contract. 66 Practice squad contract negotiations do not count for the

purposes of Section 2(g) .67 Similarly, the NFLPA's legal department is researching the feasibility of adopting an amendment that
would limit the number of contract advisors certified by the
league.

68

III.

PROBLEMS

The UAAA, SPARTA, and Section 2(g) cause three problems.
First, they do not protect student-athletes with exhausted eligibility.
Second, they do not provide students with the right to bring an
action against unscrupulous agents. Third, they produce unfair
fees and reduce professional business intimacy. Professor R.
61. See id. at § 4 (describing compensation process).

62. See id. (noting exception to how contract advisor is compensated).
63. See id. at § 3(B) (1)-(27) (describing prohibited RGCA behavior).
64. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 3(B) (21) (a) (stating another
RGCA requirement which contract advisors must follow).
65. See id. at § 3(B) (21) (b) (noting exception to requirement § 3(B) (21) (a)).
66. See id. at § 2(6) (explaining term limit concerning certification of contract
advisors).
67. See id. (stating which types of players count to meet standards of RGCA).
68. Memorandum from Tom DePaso, National Football League Players Association, on 2004 Amendments to the NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Advisors, to the Contract Advisors (May 18, 2004) (on file with Villanova Sports &
Entertainment LawJournal) (describing 2004 amendments to regulations, specifically, NFLPA's legal department).
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Michael Rogers addressed the first problem two years ago. 69 Jeremy
Bloom is tackling the second issue. 70 Thus, I will discuss the third
problem exclusively.
The contract advisor industry needs improvement. The status
quo is harming NFL players, even though a majority of it is honest
and law abiding. Recently, the NFLPA reported that agents, business partners, and financial advisors cheated seventy-eight NFL
players out of more than $42,000,000 in 2002.71 Recognizing this
harm, it is clear that the industry needs young aspiring contract
advisors. They are our future leaders, possessing the energy and
motivation needed to fight unethical behavior. The irony is that
fight is the desired end of the UAAA, SPARTA, and RGCA. Unfortunately, the excessive financial considerations they produce stifle
that fight by barring aspiring contract advisors from competing in
the multi-state game.
A.

The Multi-State Game

Sports are everywhere. Consequently, athlete representation is
a multi-state game. Today forty-nine of the fifty states have collegiate football programs. 72 Moreover, this past 2003-04 NFL season, forty-eight of those forty-nine states were represented on the
active NFL league roster per the various players' undergraduate in69. See Rogers, supra note 26, at 69-73 (discussing shortcomings of Uniform
Athlete Agent Act). Professor Rogers's article examines the UAAA's definition of
"student-athlete" and its limitation to those students with remaining eligibility. See
id. at 65 (defining "student-athlete" under UAAA and its limits). Professor Rogers
proposes that the definition be modified to apply to all student-athletes including
seniors whose eligibility is exhausted, as they too need protection from unscrupulous agents. See id. at 78-79 (describing proposal for changes to UAAA).
70. University of Colorado wide receiver and Olympic skierJeremy Bloom is
fighting to equip student-athletes with more rights. Bloom, in association with California Senator Kevin Murray, drafted the Student Athlete's Bill of Rights
("SABR"). See generally S.193, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). SABR proposes
that a university not be bound to the "rules or policies of any organization ....nor
make a contract with any party, that dictates the terms, value, and conditions of
student athlete scholarships .... " Id. at § 67371. Most importantly, the SABR
would provide a stipend to cover the full cost of attending college, which includes
$2,400 extra for necessary travel, out of season medical expenses, clothing and
leisure activities. See Andrew Zimbalist, Jeremy Bloom can guide NCAA to logical reform,
STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J., Feb. 9 - 15, 2004, at 31 (discussing Bloom's California bill in relation to NCAA amateurism difficulties).

71. Letter from Alan M. Rothstein, CPA, PFS, Vice President, Asset Strategies
Inc., to Lloyd Z. Remick, Esq., President, Zane Management, Inc. (June 10, 2004)
(on file with author) (stating need for improvement in contract advisor industry).
72. Alaska is the exception. See Peter Wolf & Ross Baker, College football team
homepages (by state), at http://www.bol.ucla.edu/-prwolfe/cfootball/LinksList.html
(last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (showing all states except Alaska have football
programs).
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stitutions. 73 The average number of states represented per team
was twenty-eight.7 4 Viewing these statistics, it becomes clear that
young contract advisors must register in as many states as possible,
because only registering in one or two states severely limits his or
her ability to obtain clients; hence, the phrase "the multi-state
game."
The UAAA is a direct result of the multi-state game. Prior to its
drafting, a number of agents lobbied for uniform registration, as
they were spending hours upon hours executing several unique
state licensure applications. 75 The NCCUSL acknowledged their
complaints when it included uniform registration procedures in the
UAAA. Despite recognizing this need, the NCCUSL failed to establish a uniform registration fee. Thus, each UAAA member state has
its own separate fee. Currently, registration fees range from $20 to
$2,500, with a mean of $1,260 and an average of $459.76 Since nine
of the twenty-eight UAAA states and territories reduced their renewal registration fee, the average renewal registration fee drops
slightly to $414. 7 7 Three states offer reduced registration fees for
registration based upon a certificate of registration or licensure is-

73. Vermont was not represented this past season. Such data was compiled
through a roster review of each NFL player's undergraduate institution. Roster

information is available through each team's link at www.nfl.com.
74. Such data was compiled through a roster review of each NFL player's undergraduate institution. Roster information is available through each team's link
at www.nfl.com. For a breakdown of the number of states represented on each

team's roster, see Appendix C.
75. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT AcT, Prefatory Note, 7 U.L.A. 191 (Supp. 2000)

(describing need for uniform registration). The drafters of the UAAA note that
"[c]onscientious agents operating in more than a single State must have nightmares caused by the lack of uniformity in the existing statutes, the difficulty in
compliance and the severity of penalties which may be imposed for violations." Id.;
see also Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, Athlete Agent Legislation in the New Millenium: State
Statutes and the Uniform Athlete Agents Act, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 263, 276
(2001) (discussing tenuous state of athlete agent legislation).
76. For a complete breakdown of the registration and renewal fees associated
with each UAAA and non-UAAA state and territory, see Appendix B.
77. Those states are Alabama (ALA. CODE § 8-26A-9 (2002)); Florida (FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 468.453 (West 2001)); Kentucky (Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 164.6915
(Michie Supp. 2004)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 81A.09 (West Supp. 2004));
Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-42-17 (2004)); New York (N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw
§ 8 9 9 -g (McKinney Supp. 2004)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-15.1.08
(Supp. 2003)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2130 (2002)); and West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-39-9 (Michie 2002)). For state statute information,
see UAAA History, supranote 12. For a complete breakdown of the registration and
renewal fees associated with each UAAA and non-UAAA state and territory, see
Appendix B.
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sued by another UAAA state. 78 Interestingly, the NCCUSL stated in
the UAAA that:
The amount of [registration] fees is left for each State to
determine. Some States with existing acts have set fees in
amounts sufficient to recover the cost of administration.
If that approach is taken, a fee for registration or renewal
based on registration or renewal of registration in another
evaluation and
State should be less than when a complete
79
review of an application is necessary.
Despite these guidelines, only the foregoing few states follow them;
hence, the present problems persist.
In addition, two states offer registration advantages for business organizations. In Pennsylvania, individuals pay a registration
fee of $200, while corporations pay a registration fee of $400.80 Individuals registering in Texas pay $1,000, but individuals who work
for a business entity only pay $100.81 These registration fees, when
combined with SPARTA's failure to address the subject and Section
2(g)'s ouster clause, are unfair because they create an environment
that places beginning contract advisors at a significant competitive
advantage. Simultaneously, these fees reduce the professional business intimacy associated with contract advisor-client relations.
B.

Unfairness

The UAAA, SPARTA, Section 2(g) and the myriad of state registration fees are unfair. As mentioned, aspiring contract advisors
must pay a separate registration fee in every state. In the multi-state
game, fees and expenses accumulate quickly. The average beginning contract advisor cannot afford these expenses, because he or
she is most likely in the midst of paying the annual NFLPA fee,
repaying student loans, making mortgage payments, paying off a
car, starting a family and facing practice overhead.
As a result, aspiring contract advisors with law degrees are
forced, while simultaneously being lucky to at least have the chance
78. Those states are Alabama, Arkansas and Pennsylvania. See ALA. CODE § 826A-9 (2002); see also Apu. CODE ANN. § 17-16-109 (2001); 5 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 3308 (West Supp. 2004). For state statute information, see UAAA History, supra
note 12.
79. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT § 9, 7 U.L.A. 211 (Supp. 2000) (stating
how registration fees are determined state by state).
80. See5 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3308(a) (1) (West Supp. 2004) (noting monetary differences between individuals and corporations).
81. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2051.107 (Vernon 2004) (detailing fees of individuals and those affiliated with corporations).
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to work, in the District Attorney's Office, Public Defender's Office
or a law firm. There, they can at least receive a steady paycheck.
Deadlines, billable hours, mortgage payments and familial needs,
however, create congested schedules and long hours.
Similarly, non-lawyer agents find work elsewhere, but often
times they fall victim to the same schedules and hours. Consequently, these young men and women put their dreams of becoming a NFLPA contract advisor on hold, while they try to make ends
meet. Most times these dreams are never re-visited.
Quantity breeds quality. Therefore, if we allow more contract
advisors into the NFLPA it will help improve the industry. Under
this approach, the aspiring agents of today will become the ethical
status quo of tomorrow. Simultaneously, the industry will become
more service oriented and better geared toward the needs of athletes. This evolution is impossible, however, if contract advisors
continue to be subject to the exorbitant registration fees that the
UAAA produces.
SPARTA does not help the problem. As written, it is silent on
the issue of registration fees. Ironically, while it recognizes the
need for federal regulation, it fails to ensure a fair and reasonable
means of registration.
Section 2(g) adds to the unfairness because it gives the NFLPA
a license to strip an agent of his or her certification. Interestingly,
Section 2(g) disrobes contract advisors of their certification while
they abide by NFLPA requirements, pay membership fees, attend
annual meetings, and compete with their 900 plus brother and sister agents. 8 2 In effect, Section 2 (g) rebuts the pillars of laissez-faire,
by limiting competition and depriving one the opportunity to work
in the field of his or her choice.
Some may argue that football player representation is not a
binding concern. Preventing people from working in the field of
their choice, however, frustrates the fundamental freedoms of our
nation, and maintaining the American way is always a concern.
C.

The Reduction of Professional Business Intimacy

Alternatively, some young men and women sidestep the unfairness, debt and hustle by joining large agencies, which are full of
divisions, departments and specialized sectors.
82. See

NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N CERTIFIED CONTRACT ADVISORS

DIRECTORY 240-54 (2004) (listing NFLPA agents).
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The product of these large agencies is scattered representation, under which an athlete speaks to one person for this and another person for that, phone tag becomes the communication
norm, and face to face, one-on-one meetings are phased out. As
the RGCA notes, contract advisors serve their clients in a fiduciary
capacity.8 3 When one owes another a fiduciary duty, trust and the

other's better interest are at the nerve center of the fiduciary's
every decision. The fiduciary duty an agent owes an athlete is
uniquely intimate and requires an unusually high degree of trust.
Lawyers, accountants, personal managers, business managers
and booking agents all serve their clients in a fiduciary capacity.
When an agent represents an athlete, many of the aforementioned
jobs and relationships are combined into one. Typically, agents
handle their client's business affairs and wealth like that of an accountant or business manager. Additionally, they publicize and
promote their clients, and provide them with long term planning
(similar to that of a personal manager). Further, they seek employment on behalf of their clients through endorsements, sponsorships and speaking engagements much like that of a booking agent.
Lastly, they negotiate their client's contracts and if the agent is a
lawyer, he or she may very well aid in the drafting process. Athletes
trust that these services will increase their value in the market, ease
the transition from the playing field to the booth, and lead towards
a prominent retirement.
These services are very intimate and personal, and in order to
tailor them properly an agent must communicate with his or her
client regularly.8 4 Providing intimate and personal services comes
83. See ATLPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 3(A) (1)-(17) (describing relationship between contract advisors and their clients).
84. SeeMODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 - 1.18 (amended 2003) (providing ethical rules for attorneys). If the agent is a lawyer, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct further regulate his or her practice. The Rules most applicable to agent/lawyers are the following:
Rule 1.1 requires that agent/lawyers provide their clients with competent,

skilled, knowledgeable, thorough, and prepared representation. See id. at 1.1.
Rule 1.2 requires that agent/lawyers allow their clients to set the ends of the
relationship. See id. at 1.2. The agent/lawyer is then required to consult with the
athlete as to the means he or she intends to use in meeting the ends. See id. This
rule also allows the agent/lawyer to limit the scope of the representation, if a limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the athlete gives informed written consent. See id. at 1.2(c). Informed consent means that the client is fully aware
of the ramifications of any decisions made. See id. at 1.0(e) (stating definitions).
Finally, this rule prohibits an agent/lawyer from counseling or assisting a client in
regard to criminal or fraudulent behavior. See id. at 1.2(d).
Rule 1.3 requires that an agent/lawyer act reasonably, diligently, and
or her client. See id. at 1.3.
when representing
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naturally to a sole practitioner, but less naturally to a large agency
with multiple departments, sectors and junior agents. It is easier
for a sole practitioner to establish trust with an athlete because he
or she can "hold the client's hand" and tailor services directly toward the needs of the athlete. Although the variety of service a
large agency offers a player is valuable and cannot be discounted,
the core of the industry is professional business intimacy.
Unfortunately, exorbitant registration fees and the multi-state
game, make it difficult for sole practitioners to provide business intimacy. As a result, large agencies are becoming the norm in the
agent industry. The 2004 NFL draft provides a fine illustration.
Rule 1.4 requires that an agent/lawyer inform his or her athlete client of the
ramifications associated with any consensual decision the athlete makes. See id. at
1.4. This rule requires that the agent/lawyer inform the client about the status of
all relevant matters promptly. See id.
Rule 1.5 requires that agent/lawyers keep fees reasonable. See id. at 1.5. If a
fee is contingent, the agent/lawyer must present it to the athlete in writing. See id.
at 1.5(c). Further, if fees are split with other agent/lawyers, the division must be in
proportion to the services provided, the total fee must be reasonable, and the athlete client must agree to such division in writing. See id. at 1.5(e). This fee rule is
very important in sports like Major League Baseball where the Players' Association
collective bargaining agreement does not limit agents' fees and allows them to be
negotiated freely.
Rule 1.6 requires that the agent/lawyer keep all information relating to representation of the athlete client confidential unless the athlete gives informed consent, or disclosure is necessary to prevent reasonably certain death, substantial
bodily harm, criminal activity, fraud that will most likely result in substantial injury
to the financial interests of another, or to secure legal advice about the agent/
lawyer's compliance with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, establish a defense on behalf of the agent/lawyer, or to comply with another law or court order.
See id. at 1.6.
Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.18, require that the agent/lawyer not represent an athlete if such representation will cause a conflict of interest with another current,
former, or potential client. See id. at 1.7, 1.8, 1.9. If the current, former, or potential client gives informed written consent, the agent/lawyer may represent the athlete in most situations. See id.
Rule 1.8 requires that an agent/lawyer not enter into a business transaction
with an athlete client unless the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable, the athlete client is informed in writing
about the opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel on the transaction, and the client gives informed consent. See id. at 1.8. Additionally, the agent/
lawyer shall not use information relating to the representation of the athlete client
to her disadvantage unless he or she gives informed consent. See id. at 1.8(b).
Further, the agent/lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from the client or
testamentary gift, or prepare such a gift. See id. at 1.8(c). Lastly, prior to the conclusion of such representation, the agent/lawyer shall not make or negotiate an
agreement that gives the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal based on the
representation. See id. at 1.8(d).
Rule 1.10 states that if an agent/lawyer is in a firm and he or she is disqualified from representing an athlete due to a conflict with a potential client, the entire firm is disqualified through imputation. See id. at 1.10.
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Out of the 224 players drafted in the traditional seven rounds,
seventeen agencies had at least five or more players, for a total of
117 between them.8 5 As mentioned, there are over 900 certified
contract advisors registered with the NFLPA.8 6 Thus, approximately 890 contract advisors compete for the remaining 107
athletes.
Competition is the backbone of American business and many
would consider the 2004 draft's ferocious level of competition as
business at its finest. They are wrong, however, because the competition there was not fair, courtesy of unaffordable registration fees.
As alluded to earlier, such unfairness is causing mergers and
large-scale representation. Unfortunately, often times when a large
agency represents an athlete, the athlete is in danger of becoming a
number, instead of being a client with individual needs and characteristics. In the end, professional business intimacy is reduced.
Inadvertently, Section 2(g) furthers the move toward large
agency representation, because partners in large agencies can assign clients to a contract advisor employee, who may have failed to
sign a roster player on his or her own. Basically, a large firm can
"spread" its clientele to ensure that none of its employees lose their
certification. A sole practitioner does not have that luxury.
Before outlining the solution, we offer a word of caution. Big
business domination leads to conglomeration, and conglomeration
can be dangerous. One example is the music industry. Every time
two major labels merge, thousands lose their jobs, from the senior
executives at the top to the recording studio custodians at the bottom. In order to prevent a similar occurrence in the agent industry, we propose the following solution.
IV.

SOLUTION

In order to assure fairness and reinforce professional business
intimacy, the industry needs an affordable federal licensure for ath85. See Len Pasquarelli, Ind. firm represents four first-rounders, ESPN.CoM, at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=Pasquarellilen&id=

1809767 (May 26, 2004) (stating breakdown of firms that had at least five clients
selected in traditional seven rounds, as follows: Domann & Pittman - 9, Octagon 9, Priority Sports and Entertainment - 9, Rosenhaus Sports - 8, Sportstars - 8,
ARM - 8, Maximum Sports - 8, Joel Segal - 8, SFX Sports - 7, Pro Sports & Entertainment - 4, IMG Football - 4).

86. See NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N CERTIFIED CONTRACT ADVISORS
DIREcToRY 240-54 (2004) (stating number of contract advisors to illustrate stiff
competition for athletes).
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lete agents. The solution can be achieved in three steps: modifying
the UAAA, amending SPARTA and revising Section 2(g).
A.

Modifying the UAAA

The first step toward affordable federal athlete agent licensure
is modifying the UAAA. As written, the means of registration are

uniform, but registration fees are not. Hence, the unfair expenses
that one must pay in order to compete in the industry. Fortunately,
the remedy is simple; modify the UAAA by removing registration

fees from Section Nine of the UAAA. In turn, the UAAA will be
void of fees and lay the foundation for a SPARTA amendment.
B.

Amending SPARTA

Amending SPARTA is the second step. Currently, twenty-two
states have yet to adopt the UAAA. These twenty-two states, many of
which do not require registration, remain hot beds for unethical
athlete agents. To prevent unethical behavior, reduce student-athlete ineligibility, and protect academic institutions from sanctions, a
federal law is needed to solidify registration in these states. This
was the motivation behind SPARTA. However, as written, SPARTA
is silent in terms of registration fees, and that silence leads to the
aforementioned unfairness and reduction of professional business
intimacy. Thus, an amendment is needed that will create a reasonable and fair registration fee.

The registration fee should effectively screen applicants and
offset registration costs, yet not bar aspiring contract advisors from

the industry. With these thoughts in mind, a one-time nationwide
registration fee of $2,000 per individual, plus an annual $1,000 renewal fee would be appropriate. This figure would be exclusive of
NFLPA and any other players' association fees.
Under this plan, the registration of the 900 plus NFLPA contract advisors will create large annual revenues. Additional
thousands will be generated by the registration of athlete agents
who are registered with the Major League Baseball Players Association, the National Hockey League Players Association and the National Basketball Players Association, as well as those who represent
individual athletes, e.g. boxing.
The key to creating a fair registration fee is defining the word
individual in a way that subjects every person to registration. Accordingly, SPARTA's definitions section must be amended to include a definition for individual. Such definition should read as
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follows: "any one person acting for his or herself or within a business organization." This minor adjustment will assure equal fairness between all contract advisors and dissolve any registration
advantage for large agencies. In turn, there will be less incentive
for agents to form large agencies at the expense of professional business intimacy. Hopefully, it will help prevent conglomeration.
Opponents may argue that a lower fee will create a greater opportunity for runners and illegal funneling. Agent regulations,
however, now have teeth at both the federal and state level. Thus, it
will be difficult for agents to perform such acts without suffering
the consequences.
C.

Revising Section 2(g)

The final step in ensuring fairness and strengthening business
intimacy is revising Section 2(g). Acknowledging the NFLPA's desire to decongest itself, an ouster clause, like Section 2(g), seems
logical. However, the term of any ouster clause should be long
enough to afford a contract advisor the opportunity to develop his
or her practice, work with athletes and engage in fair competition.
With these thoughts in mind, Section 2(g)'s term should be extended from three years to five years. Additionally, signing a practice squad player should satisfy league requirements.
Similarly, the NFLPA should cease researching the feasibility of
adopting an amendment that would limit the number of contract
advisors certified by the league. There is no reason why the NFLPA
should seek to bar aspiring agents from pursuing the career of their
choice, especially when it has an ouster clause in place. Imagine if
the American Bar Association attempted to limit or cap bar admittance. There would be a plethora of actions brought nationwide.
V.

CONCLUSION

Below Section Nine of the UAAA, its drafters wrote:
[A] thlete agent registration is the cornerstone of this act.
High registration fees imposed by some states with existing acts have probably contributed to seemingly small
numbers of registrants under these acts. The success of
this act may be contingent upon the implementation of a
reasonable fee structure that does not motivate noncompliance.

87

87. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS AcT § 9, 7 U.L.A. 211 (Supp. 2000) (explaining
high fees implemented by state law).
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Recognizing their vision, we need to modify the UAAA, amend
SPARTA, and revise Section 2(g), in order to create fair and reasonable federal athlete agent licensure and abolish the current exorbitant expense that is associated with the industry. In sum, the
natural laws of supply and demand should govern entry into the
contract advisor industry, not overly expensive registration fees.
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APPENDIX

A

State and Territory Adoptions of the UAAA
Alabama
Connecticut
Florida
Indiana
Maryland
Montana
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Texas
Utah
Wisconsin

Arizona
Delaware
Georgia
Kansas
Minnesota
Nevada
North Dakota
Rhode Island
Utah
Washington

Arkansas
District of Columbia
Idaho
Kentucky
Mississippi
New York
Oklahoma
Tennessee
U.S. Virgin Islands
West Virginia

States with Active UAAA Legislation in their Legislative Chambers
Illinois

Missouri

South Carolina

States with Existing non-UAAA Athlete Agent Regulation Law
Iowa
Colorado
California
Missouri
Michigan
Louisiana
South Carolina
Oregon
Ohio
States and TerritoriesLacking Athlete Agent Regulations
Alaska
Maine
New Hampshire
Puerto Rico
Virginia

Hawaii
Massachusetts
New Jersey
South Dakota
Wyoming

Illinois
Nebraska
New Mexico
Vermont

From the NCAA website at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/
enforcement/agents/uaaa/history.html.
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B

UAAA State RegistrationFees
State

Registration Reciprocity
Fee
Registration
Fee

Renewal
Fee

Renewal
Reciprocity
Fee

Term

Other

Alabama

$200

$100

$100

$100

2 years

None

Arizona

$20

$20

$20

$20

2 years

None

Arkansas

$500

$100

$500

$100

2 years

None

Connecticut

$200

$200

$200

$200

1 year

None

Delaware

$2,500

$2,500

$2,500

$2,500

2 years

None

District of
Columbia

$515

$515

$515

$515

2 years

None

Florida

$750

$750

$445 on
even years

$445 on
even years

1 year

None

Georgia

$200

$200

$200

$200

Term expires
on June 30th
of odd years

$10,000
Bond

Idaho

$250

$250

$250

$250

Term expires
annually on
agents
birthday

None

Indiana

$700

$700

$700

$700

2 years

None

Kansas

$515

$515

$515

$515

2 years

None

Kentucky

$300

$300

$100

$100

1 year

None

Maryland

$1,000

$1,000

$1,000

$1,000

2 years

None

Minnesota

$500

$500

$400

$400

2 years

None

Mississippi

$100

$100

$50

$50

Term expires
June 30th
annually

$50
Filing
Fee

Montana

$200

$200

$200

$200

2 years

None

Nevada

$500

$500

$500

$500

2 years

None

New York

$100

$100

$50

$50

2 years

None

North Carolina

$200

$200

$200

$200

1 year

None

North Dakota

$250

$250

$150

$150

2 years

None

$1,000

$1,000

$1,000

$1,000

2 years

None

Pennsylvania

$200
individual
$400
corporation

$150
individual
$300
corporate

$200
individual
$400
corporate

$150
individual
$400
corporate

2 years

None

Rhode Island

$100

$100

$100

$100

1 year

None

Tennessee

$500

$500

$200

$200

2 years

None

$1000
individual
$100 per
individual
in an
entity

1 year

None

Oklahoma

Texas

$1000
individual
$100 per
individual
in an entity

Utah

$1000
$1000
individual
individual
$100 per
$100 per
individual
individual
in an entity
in an
entity

$510

$510

$510

$510

2 years

None

Washington

$0

$0

$0

$0

None

None

West Virginia

$50

$50

$10

$10

2 years

None
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Non-UAAA State Registration Fees

State
California

Registration
Fee
$30

Reciprocity
Transfer
Registration
Renewal Fee Renewal Fee
Fee
N/A
N/A
N/A

Term
None

Other
$100,000
insurance
coverage
None
$25,000
Bond

Colorado
Iowa

$0
$300

N/A
N/A

N/A
$300

N/A
N/A

N/A
1 year

Louisiana

$100

N/A

$100

N/A

Expires
June
30th
annually

None

Michigan
Missouri
Ohio

$500
$500

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
$500
$500

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
2 years
2 years

250

N/A

$250

N/A

1 year

None
None
$20,000
Bond
None

$300

N/A

$300

N/A

2 years

None

Oregon
South Carolina

0

From the NCAA website
history.html.

at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/enforcement/agents/uaaa/
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APPENDIX C

NL Club

States Represented

Arizona Cardinals

25

Atlanta Falcons

33

Baltimore Ravens

28

Buffalo Bills

30

Carolina Panthers

28

Chicago Bears

29

Cincinnati Bengals

32

Cleveland Browns
Dallas Cowboys

28

Denver Broncos

28
29

Detroit Lions

31

Green Bay Packers

24

Houston Texans
Jacksonville Jaguars

28
28

Indianapolis Colts

30

Kansas City Chiefs

25

Miami Dolphins

26

Minnesota Vikings

29

New England Patriots

31

New Orleans Saints
New York Giants

27

New York Jets

30

Oakland Raiders
Philadelphia Eagles

30
26

Pittsburgh Steelers

27

St. Louis Rams

23

San Diego Chargers

26

San Francisco 49ers

26

Seattle Seahawks
Tampa Bay Buccaneers

32

Tennessee Titans
Washington Redskins

23

31

26
29

Average
Data compiled by a roster review of 2003-2004 season
from the NFL website at http://www.nfl.com.
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